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Traffic departments of airlines are continually confronted with
questions which, although not always new to the business of trans-
portation, are novel to air transportation. Among the many per-
plexing questions are those which arise when a person applies for
carriage, whom, for some reason or another, the carrier does not
wish to accept as a passanger.
The question has frequently arisen in other forms of trans-
portation where applicants for passage have bcen intoxicated, in-
sane, blind, invalids, immoral, aged, very young, or prisoners, etc.
There has also been a great deal of difficulty, particularly in south-
ern states, in accommodating colored persons. The problem has
been complicated not only by social conditions but also by the "Jim
Crow" statutes, requiring the separating of white and colored
passengers, and by "Civil Rights" statutes of various states.
There are no reported court decisions concerning airlines
which bear upon the problem of passenger discrimination. Con-
sequently, it is necessary to look to cases which have dealt with
water-carriers, stage-coaches, railroads and motor-buses. But these
cases should not be taken as absolute authority for applying the
same rules to airlines. They must be considered as analogous only
in view of the practical aspects of airline operation and the physical
features of flight.
*The writer gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance rendered
by leading airline and bus company officials in all sections of the United
States and Canada whose ideas and suggestions contained in replies to
questions directed to them have been embodied herein.
tMember of the Chicago Bar. District Manager, Braniff Airways, Inc.Formerly pilot, First Pursuit Group, Selfridge Field. First Lieutenant,
Air Corps Reserve, U. S. A.
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AIRLINES AS COMMON CARRIERS
In the early stages of airline operation the notion prevailed-
and still does to some extent-that airlines were private carriers.
If they are private carriers, then this subject is not controversial,
since a private carrier "can refuse, either for a bad reason or no
reason at all, to transport individuals without incurring any liability
for such refusal." 2 But if a carrier, no matter how much it desires
to be a private carrier, holds its services out in such a way as to
invite the public generally to avail themselves thereof, it becomes
a common carrier. Thus, "a common carrier of passengers is one
who undertakes for hire to carry all persons indifferently, who may
apply for passage, so long as there is room and there is no legal
excuse for refusing."
S
In deciding upon the liability of aircraft in accident cases,
the courts have recently held those whose operations resembled
the services of airlines to be common carriers to the extent that
they owed the highest degree of care to passengers. 4 As yet few
1. The tickets of some airlines specify that they are private carriers.
John K. Edmunds, "Aircraft Passenger Ticket Contracts," 1 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 321, 322 (1930); E. A. Harriman, "Carriage of Passengers by
Air," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 33, note pp. 36, 37; Howard Wikoff, "Uniform
Rules for Air Passenger Liability," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 512 (1930).
However, such a provision is probably ineffectual to relieve the airline of
its duty as a common carrier. "Proposed Uniform Passenger Contract"
Submitted by the American Air Transport Association, by the Committee
on Uniform Ticket Contract and Standard Ticket Forms, I JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 228, 229 (1930) : "There is hardly a company that has submitted
its ticket form to your committee that is not, in the opinion of a majority
of the committee a common carrier and would be adjudicated such in any
supreme court in the land". E. A. Harriman, loc. cit. p. 49, doubts if ticket
provision claiming company not to be a common carrier would have any
more effect than as evidence; John K. Edmunds, loc. cit. p. 323; Howard
Wikoff, loe. cit. And it has been so held in Law v. Transcontinental Air
Transport, (not officially reported) 1931 U. S. Av. R. 205 (U. S. Dist.
Court, Eastern Dist. of Pa., June 11, 1931), Note, 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
131 (1932), Note, 3 Air L. Rev. 73 (1932). The reason is that a common
carrier's duty to its passengers is not entirely contractual, but is imposed
upon it by the public nature of its employment. Hannibal Railroad v. Swift,
12 Wall. 262 (1870).
2. Armistead M. Dobie, Bailments and Carriers, p. 519 (1914).
3. Riggsby v. Tritton, 129 S. E. 493 (Va., 1925); Saltonstall v. Stock-
ton, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12, 271 (C. D. Md. 1838); McCoy v. Pacific Spruce
Corp., 1 Fed. (2d) 853 (1924) ; Frick v. City of Gary, 135 N. E. 346 (Ind.,
1922) ; Bennett v. Dutton, 10 N. H. 481 (1839); N. & C. R. Co. v. Messino,
1 Sneed (Tenn.) 220 (1853) ; McGregor v. Gill, 114 Tenn. 521, 86 S. W. 318,
108 Am. St. Rep. 919; Gillingham v. Ohio River R. Co., 14 L. R. A. 798 (W.
Va., 1891) ; Armistead M. Dobie, op. cit., Note 2, p. 518.
4. Hagymasi v. Colonial Western Airways (not officially reported)
2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 383 (1931) ; 1931 U. S. Av. R. 73, New Jersey Su-
preme Court, Essex County, April 10, 1931. At Law; Note, 2 Air L. Rev.
402 (1931); Smith v. O'Donnell, 67 Cal. App. Dec. 838, 5 Pac. (2d) 690,
(1931); Note, 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 463 (1932; Note, 16 Minn. L. R.
580 (1932), Dictum: "There can be no doubt under the general law of
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cases have reached the higher courts where an airline has been
held to owe the high degree of care required of a common carrier. 5
However, the cases referred to would seem to be authority that
they are subject to this duty to passengers.
Likewise, nearly all law review articles on the subject have
concluded that airlines are common carriers from the point of
view of negligence liability, or have assumed them to be such.'
In an able discussion of the matter, Professor Zollmann remarks
that "a service through the air which runs on schedule, for which
tickets can be bought by a proper person who has the price and
the inclination and which gets the occupants from one place to
another is as much to be classed as a common carrier as is the
passenger service maintained by railroads, street-cars, boats and
motor-buses."'7
In considering the question of whether airlines should be
legally classed as common carriers, so as to forbid any discrimina-
tion in accepting passengers, it is important to review the theory
and history from which such duty of common carriers arose.
ECONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY OF COMMON CARRIERS
The economic and social conditions which existed in medieval
England represent the historical reason for some carriers being
classed as common. The political theory of those times was that
common carriers as we have found it, that those airlines which are engaged
in the passenger service on regular schedules on definite routes fall within
the classification. The industry itself should be desirous of assuring the
public that those who accept their invitation to travel by air will be accorded
that protection which may be afforded by the exercise of the utmost care
and diligence for their safety."
5. Allison v. Standard Air Lines, Inc. (S. D. Cal.) ... Fed. (2d)
1930; U. S. Av. R. 292 (1930); Note, 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 71-79 (1931);
Notes, 2 Air L. Rev. 86 and 93 (1931) ; Law v. Transcontinental Air Trans-
port, Inc. supra, Note. 1.
6. Sam G. Bratton, "Let the Interstate Commerce Commission Regu-
late Aeronautics", 4 Public Utilities Fortnightly 779 (1929) ; John K. Ed-
munds, loc. cit., Note 1; W. J. Davis, "State Regulation of Aircraft Com-
mon Carriers", 1 Air L. Rev. 47 (1930) ; Fred D. Fagg, Jr., and Abraham
Fishman, "Certificates of Convenience for Air Transport," 3 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 226 (1932); Rowan A. Greer, "Civil Liability of an Aviator as
Carrier of Goods and Passengers", 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 241 (1930);
E. A. Harriman, loc. cit., Note 1; Senator Bratton (N. M.) in Congressional
Record, Jan. 28, 1930, p. 2587, quoted by E. A. Harriman in 1 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 349 (1930) ; Howard C. Knotts, "Certificates of Convenience and
Necessity for Aircraft Carriers", 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 58 (1932) ; Arnold
D. McNair, The Law of the Air, pp. 126-7 (London, 1932); "Proposed
Uniform Passenger Contract", loc. cit., note 1; Myron W. Watkins, "Air
Transport Rate'Making", 3 Air L. Rev. 127 (1932); Carl Zollmann, "Air-
craft as Common Carriers", 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 190 (1930).
7. Carl Zollmann, loc. cit., p. 196.
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the people existed for the government. Certain privileged indi-
viduals were granted large land areas in return for their support
of the crown. The people in turn extended their efforts in sup.-
port of the immediate over-lord. In such a situation it was but
natural that every man had his place; and a true balance was sought
by no one being allowed to interfere with the employment of an-
other. It was desired to benefit everyone fairly and reasonably. 8
In the towns, certain trades were entirely in the hands of
guilds. In the country, the manorial estates were practically self-
sustaining communities. In these, as in every community, whether
large or small, there were certain businesses which were necessary
in order that the community as a whole might function. For one
thing, it was necessary for every man to eat. Thus we find that
the victualler was obliged to sell food to anyone who presented
the price.9 The purchaser's need was usually immediate and the
market was limited-due to economic conditions. He would pos-
sibly suffer if refused food. At present, of course, there are so
many food stores that it is unnecessary to require them to sell to
everyone who wants to buy.
The bake-shops and the mills were also essential in supplying
the people with food. These present a much stronger example of
a duty to serve all who apply, because in any one community there
might be only one of each. They required large investments of
capital and were provided by the lord of the manor in many in-
stances. Subsequently, the signorial bans covered these and the
lord granted franchises to certain persons to conduct them.' 0
Clothing being another essential of the individual, the medieval
tailor also was required to serve all who applied. In those days
there were very few tailors-though times have changed a great
deal since then-so that the necessary article had to be provided
by him. In this he enjoyed a sort of monopoly which placed him
among those who by calling held themselves out to serve the
public."
Furthermore, there were so few doctors that if the one called
upon refused to treat the patient the latter might not be able to
obtain any medical aid. Consequently, an early rule required sur-
8. See Bruce Wyman, Public Service Corporation, Vol. I (1911),
for full discussion of history and theory of businesses holding out to serve
the public.
9. Bruce Wyman, op. cit., note 8, p. 9.
10. Ibid, p. 4.
11. Ibid, p. 8.
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geons to serve all who applied."2 There are so many doctors today
that there is now no necessity for such a rule.
Since a horse's hoof could be injured by several miles of
travel to another smith, those who held themselves out as smiths
were required to serve all who applied. The demand was im-
mediate, necessary, and the individual was at the mercy of the
smith at hand for service.' 8
Coming a step nearer to the application of the rule to carriers,
we find that inns were among those held to profess a public call-
ing." A traveller arriving at an inn in the evening might be too
tired to travel on to the next inn, many miles beyond perhaps, if
the first inn refused to accept him as a guest. The roads were
barely passable, weather conditions might cause him undue expos-
ure and illness, and robbers infested the highways making night
travel particularly dangerous. Moreover, the number of inns was
restricted by law. Although they were not licensed, it was not
only a civil wrong but also an indictable offense for anyone to
build an inn so close to an established one that it would compete
with it detrimentally."5
As already mentioned, the roads were very bad. In most in-
stances they were nothing more than foot-paths over which cara-
vans of horses laden with goods and passengers travelled. Travel
was hazardous because of thieves and robber bands. Consequently,
it was necessary that well-protected caravans carry goods for mer-
chants who could not individually have afforded the journeys. Few
caravans passed over the roads so that the merchant was at the
mercy of the carrier in getting his goods transported. It was there-
fore early decided that the carrier was liable in damages for re-
fusal to accept goods from a merchant.' 6
12. Ibid, p. 7.
13. Ibid, pp. 8, 9; Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show. 327 (1683); Lane v.
Cotton, 12 Mod. 472 (1701).
14. Bruce Wyman, op. cit., note 8, p. 11; Jackson v. Rogers, supra;
Lane v. Cotton, supra; Bacon's Abridgement, Vol. 5, p. 230 (1854 ed.).;
Bouvier's Institutes, Vol. I, p. 408 (1854); Cooley's Blackstone, Vol. 2, pp.
162, 3, (2nd ed. 1872); Kent's Commentaries on American Law, Vol. 2, p.
597, note (12th ed. 1873) ; Halsbury, Laws of England, Vol. 17, p. 306,
(1908).
15. Bacon's Abridgement, op. cit., Note 14, p. 226.
16. The full report of Jackson v. Rogers, supra, Note 13, is as follows:
"Action on the case, for that whereas the defendant is a common carrier
from London to Lymmington et abinde retrorsum, and setting it forth as
the custom of England, that he is bound to carry them, though offered his
hire, and held by JEFFRIES, J. C., that the action is maintainable, as well as
it is against an innkeper for refusing a guest, or a smith on the road who
refuses to shoe my horse, being tendered satisfaction for the same, Note,
that it was alleged and proved that he had convenience to carry the same;
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The rule in all of the foregoing instances may be summed up
thus: where the welfare of the public was dependent upon a cer-
tain trade to such an extent that individual suffering (and hence
public harm) would result from the refusal of the proprietors of
that business to serve all fairly and reasonably then they became
so impressed with public interest that they were obliged to devote
their services to everyone.
Succeeding periods of history witnessed the partial and com-
plete overthrow of the feudal system and brought about the evolu-
tion of the theory of laissez-faire. There was less tendency to
have government control over private business, and after the Col-
onies became free from England they framed the Constitution in
such a way as to preserve much greater freedom to individual prop-
erty rights than had theretofore been enjoyed. The State then
came to represent the ancient over-lord, but the theory of govern-
ment was changed so that the State existed for the people instead
of the people for the State. However, it was still found necessary
to adhere to certain traditions of the old English law. This adher-
ence provided an exception to, or a burden upon, the rights of
individual ownership of property, so that when private property
was used for a purpose which became essential to the welfare
of the public it was still impressed with the duty to serve the pub-
lic just as were the industries of the same class in ancient times,
the reasons remaining practically the same.
The welfare of the public may well include progress of the
community. All nations are, in a sense, competitors of one another.
Most of this competition is economic or, if not economic, the attain-
ing of the desired competitive result depends largely-either in
war or in peace-upon the economic advantages possessed by each
nation. Consequently, any new enterprise which adapts itself to
being a public calling should be held to the same responsibility as
any other similar business which serves the public.
Airlines are new to our economic system but, after all, they
are merely another form of transportation. Physically, they differ
from railroads or water carriers, so that special rules may be nec-
essary for them in some instances. However, the broad general
principle that they are public enterprises and must consequently
and the plaintiff had a verdict." Reported in "Cases on the Law of Car-
riers", by Frederick Green, p. 16 (2nd ed. 1927) ; Lane v. Cotton, supra,
Note 13; Bacon's Abridgement, op. cit., Note 14, p. 152; Burn's Justice of
the Peace, Vol. 1, p. 380 (20th ed. 1805) ; Kent's Commentaries on American
LaW, op. cit., Note 14, p. 602; Bruce Wyman, op cit., note 8, p. 12.
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accept all who apply for carriage seems equally applicable to all of
them.1"
Now, what are the characteristics of airlines which place them
in the category of common carriers? The fact that an airline
operates on regular schedules, charges established fares, provides
easy access to airport terminals, and sells tickets through many
agencies, indicates that it is holding itself out to serve the public
and is therefore a common carrier.'1
Furthermore, although it cannot be strictly said that any car-
rier is naturally monopolistic, still it seems that airlines, as well as
other carriers, are virtually monopolies.19 It is true that airlines
do not require the large amount of fixed plant required of ordi-
nary natural monopolies. But, where a line already exists, it dis-
courages the establishment of a competing line because such a huge
investment is reqaired, not only for airplanes (which become ob-
solete within three to five years) but for shops, surplus parts and
equipment, leases, advertising and traffic development, that the risk
is often prohibitive. 20 And when competition does develop it soon
becomes so ruinous that mergers or agreements result or one of
the lines goes out of business, thus leaving a monoply. During the
winter of 1931-32 there were many instances of airlines dropping
out of business or merging, and leaving, in many cases, only one
airline operating between important cities.21
There is no doubt that an airline in many ways professes to
be a common carrier. It advertises in a great variety of ways,
including newspapers, posters, radio, pamphlets and personal soli-
citation; and all airlines have time-tables which are distributed
publicly.
22
17. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 126, 24 L. Ed. 77 (1876): "Property
does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make
it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, there-
fore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest,
he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit
to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing
the use; but, so long as he maintains the use he must submit to the control."
18. Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., supra, note 1; Malter
v. Split Rock Cable Rd., 128 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E. 506 (1901); Bruce Wyman,
op. cit., Note 8, pp. 190, 200, 201.
19. Ibid., p. 106.
20. Compare, Paul T. David, "Federal Regulation of Airplane Common
Carriers", 6 Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics 359 (1930) ; Contra,
Myron W. Watkins, "Economic Prospects of Air Transport", 4 Public
Utilities Fortnightly 332 (1929).
21. See Official Aviation Guide (published monthly, 608 S. Dearborn
St., Chicago, Ill.).
22. Bruce Wyman, op. cit., Note 8, pp. 168-172.
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Additional proof that airlines are common carriers is afforded
in the requirement by several states of certificates of convenience
and necessity. A number of airlines have voluntarily applied for
these certificates, thus indicating an admission that they are com-
mon carriers; for, by requesting the rights and privileges of such,
they impliedly recognize that they owe the corresponding duties.2 3
Airlines which carry both passengers and mail under the
Watres Act" are practically subsidized indirectly by the govern-
ment, since these contracts are not given out to every airline but
are confined to a few; and the Postal Department loses money in
maintaining airmail service.2 5  According to our constitutional law,
public funds can be used only for a public purpose.2 1 In order
not to assume that these airlines accept the money illegally, they
must be considered as serving the public. Many of those airlines
which do not have mail contracts have made bids for them, thus,
in effect, admitting themselves to be of such a public character as
to warrant the lawful award of the subsidy.
Although private flyers can equally well take advantage of the
lighted airways, navigation, radio and meteorological services pro-
vided by the government, it seems that these facilities were designed
primarily for the use of the airlines2 and, since they take advan-
23. Fred D. Fagg, Jr., and Abraham Fish-man, loc. cit., Note 6; Howard
C. Knotts, loc. cit., Note 6, p. 62; Bruce Wyman, op. cit., Note 8, p. 180.
24. Act of April 29, 1930, Public-No. 178-71st Congress; 1930 U. S.
Av. R. 305.
25. Paul 7'. David, Book Notices, 6 Journal oi Land and Public Utility
Economics 107-109 (1930).
26. Bruce Wyman, op. cit., Note 8, p. 185.
27. Legislative History of Air Commerce Act, 1926, 1929 U. S. Av. R.
151-152:
"European countries have found, that unless military aviation is to bear
the entire cost of the maintenance of aircraft industries and aviation de-
velopment generally, that commercial air navigation must be encouraged.
This has been done in every practical way, but principally by subsidizing
common carriers by air.
"The committee does not believe that direct subsidies arp either in
accord with the traditional policies of this country or desirable from the
economic viewpoint. The committee does believe, however, that air naviga-
tion should be furnished navigation aids corresponding to those now furn-
ished by the Government to water navigation."
Section 5b of the Act provides that "The Secretary of Commerce is
authorized to designate and establish civil airways and, within the limits
of available appropriations hereafter made by Congress, (1) to establish,
operate and maintain along such airways all necessary air navigation facili-
ties except airports, and (2) to chart such airways and arrange for pub-
lication of maps of such airways, utilizing the facilities and assistance of
existing agencies of the Government so far as practicable." The same
section proceeds to provide that "The Secretary of Commerce shall grant no
exclusive right for the use of any civil airway, airport, emergency landing
field, or other air navigation facility under his jurisdicton." Grants of ex-
clusive rights cannot be made to private businesses, and hence Congress
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tage of them, they owe the public the duty of service. Private
investment is not generally sufficient to establish either the above
facilities 28 or airports which, in a great many cases, are maintained
by municipalities, and may be established by the exercise of emi-
nent domain.
29
Historically, the very basis for the rule of common carriers
was the necessity that they accept all who applied, for the reason
of individual need, as incident to public co6rdination and the fact
that the characteristics of that business were monopolistic. Today
we find common carriers subject to the same economic phenomena.
We find, too, that an airline, when tested by the characteristics of
common carriers in general, is as much to be classed as such as is
a railroad or other public transportation system.
Hence, airlines are under the broad general duty to accept
everyone for transportation who applies. But at the same time
the carrier has certain property rights just as does one engaged in
a private enterprise. Also it owes duties of safety, protection, and
comfort to those whom it serves.3 0  These rights and duties are
superior to those owed to the individual traveller and, unless he
conforms to them, the carrier should have a right to exclude him.
The question of discrimination, therefore, resolves itself into merely
a number of legal exceptions to the general rule that all who apply
must be carried.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF AIRLINES IN RELATION TO PASSENGERS
In general it has been said that "a carrier of passengers not
only has the power but it is its duty, to adopt such rules and
regulations as will enable it to perform its duties to the travelling
public with the highest degree of efficiency, and to secure to its
passengers all possible convenience, comfort and safety."81  What
must have intended that franchises should not be given to carriers holding
themselves out to serve the public.
28. Legislative History of Air Commerce Act, 1926, supra, p. 152, "The
above facilities are of a nature that do not attract private capital because
of the impossibility of preventing competitors from making use of the
facilities if so established. It is therefore necessary that such facilities
be maintained by the Government."
29. Exercise of eminent domain has always been considered conclusive
evidence of profession of public employment. See Bruce Wyman, op. cit.,
Note 8, p. 181. Airlines do not exercise this right themselves but they do
accept the benefits of it when exercised by a municipality if they make
use of such airports.
30. Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 40 S. W. (2d) 356 (Ky.,
1931); Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Whittemore, 43 II1.'420 (1867); O'Neill
v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 155 Mass. 371, 29 N. E. 630 (1892).
31. Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., supra, p. 361; Platt v. Le-
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rules are reasonable depends on the circumstances. Thus, rules
for rejecting passengers may be reasonable if the circumstances
justify or make them expedient. Moreover, one may be excluded
who seeks passage with intent to violate the reasonable regula-
tions of the carrier.8 2
Comfort is more essential aboard an airplane in flight than on
ground or water carriers, where passengers are more or less free
to move about. The quarters in an airplane are necessarily so
restricted that passengers must remain in one place during most,
if not all, of a flight. Under these conditions a feeling of fright
and helplessness may restrain them from travelling again by air
and thereby injure the carrier's business.
Any discomfort in travel which would produce confusion
among the passengers should be avoided as endangering safety.
A steward or stewardess is available on some of the larger air-
liners to look after the comfort of the travellers. Sputum bags or
containers are provided for use in case of air-sickness. Also toilet
and lavatory facilities, drinking water, and meals are provided.
The trend in design of airliners is as much toward comfort as
speed. While these modern accommodations contribute to the
convenience of travel, they have a further purpose, namely, to
prevent confusion, due to discomfort as well as other causes, in
order to eliminate any chance of panic among the passengers which
might interfere with the pilot's control of the plane.
An airline, as a ccmmon carrier, owes the public the duty of
providing convenient service. Any condition that might call for
an unscheduled landing should, therefore, be avoided, as it would
disrupt the time schedule. Thus, conduct which would be ob-
noxious to other passengers or illness which would render the per-
son unfit for further travel might make continued flight hazardous
and demand a forced landing. Any rule, therefore, would be
considered reasonable, if promulgated for the purpose of prevent-
ing such interference with regular schedules.
Safety is the most important requirement. It is the founda-
tion of substantially all Federal and state aviation regulation.83
Thus, the Federal law provides for the examination and licens-
cocq, 158 Fed. 723, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 558; N. & W. Railroad Co. v. f, ysor,
82 Va. 250 (1886).
32. See Note 69, infra.
33. See Legislative History of Air Commerce Act, 1926, supra, Note 27,
pp. 134-135; Fred D. Fagg, Jr., and Abraham Fishman, loc cit., Note 6,
pp. 232, 241, 242; Mabel Walker Willebrandt, "Federal and State Control of
Air Carriers by Certificates of Convenience and Necessity", 3 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 159, 165 (1932).
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ing of airplane crews"' and the inspection and licensing of air-
craft." Under authority of the Act the Department of Com-
merce requires certificates of authority for an airline to operate.3"
Since it is expressly prohibited from granting an exclusive fran-
chise 3 7 this certificate is issued entirely on the showing that the
requirements of safety will be met."'
State laws have either incorporated the Federal requirements
or have established very similar ones. Even the granting of cer-
tificates of convenience and necessity for intrastate airline opera-
tions has as its basis the idea of safety, the principal requirement
being financial responsibility."' It is clear that the underlying pur-
pose is to secure safety.
The reason so much stress is laid on the requirement of safety
is obviously the dependence upon the human element in the control
of the airplane. Structural failures can be and are avoided by
proper construction and inspection on the ground, but the pilot
is always subject to making errors. It is commonly suggested
that efforts be made to make flying depend 90% on machine and
10% on the pilot, whereas approximately the opposite is now the
case. However, the human element will probably always predom-
inate in the control and navigation of heavier-than-air craft. Most
mechanical advancements in aerial navigation have enhanced safety
but they have not lessened the control demanded of the pilot. In-
stead, they have greatly increased the skill which he is required
to exercise.40
We must conclude, therefore, that anything which might inter-
fere with the pilot's control of the plane should be avoided when-
ever possible, and any rules or regulations should be considered
34. Air Commerce Act, 1926, Sec. 3(c) and (f) ; 44 Stat. L. 568; 1928
U. S. Av. R. 333.
35. Supra, sec. 3(b) and (f).
36. Supra, sec. 3(f); Air Commerce Regulations Governing Scheduled
Operations of Interstate Passenger Air Transport Service, Effective Mid-
night, May 15, 1930, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 325, and as Amended Oct. 1, 1931,
1931 U. S. Av. R. 250.
37. Air Commerce Act, 1926, supra, Note 32, sec. 5(b).
38. See Procedure for Making Application for Certificate of Authority
to Interstate Passenger Air Transport Service, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 328; Fred
D. Fagg, Jr. and Abraham Fishman, loc. cit., Note 6, note, p. 231.
39. Ibid., p. 241.
40. It is of further interest to observe that a coordination of the
mechanical knowledge necessary to construct an airplane and the ability of
a human being to glide, i. e., to handle the mechanical contrivance in the
air, was required to produce the first successful power-driven airplane flight.
See excellent discussion by C. L. M. Brown, The Conquest of the Air-An
Historical Survey (1927).
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reasonable which contribute to the assurance of non-interference
with such control during flight.
PERSONS WHO MAY BE REFUSED PASSAGE
Since airlines are common carriers, they are bound to observe
the general rule that every person has a right to be carried un-
less he possesses some personal characteristic which legally dis-
q'ualifies him therefrom. Such disqualifications depend largely
upon the circumstances in each case. On ground or water car-
riers, there is generally not as much physical danger to be en-
countered as aboard an airplane in flight. In the latter case, con-
venience and comfort are so essential as to be practically a factor
of safety and, of course, the requirement of safety is of extreme
importance. Consequently, a person applying for passage on an
airline must not only possess the personal qualifications usually
necessary to entitle him to ride on surface common carriers, but
he must not be likely to interfere in any way with the safe man-
agement of the plane.
It is obvious that a person who is disorderly or insulting to
passengers or crew may be excluded. 41 This rule is especially ap-
plicable to airlines because such conduct tends to confusion likely
to endanger the control of the plane.
Insane persons may he classed as those who are violent and
those who are harmless. Railroads have been required to accept
them when attended for the reason that their affliction is pitiable
and it is essential that they be transported to asylums by some
means.42  However, those who are violent are usually kept apart
from the other passengers. An airline should be able to refuse
any person who indicates, even in the slightest degree, that he is
41. Owens v. Macon & B. R. Co., 119 Ga. 230, 63 L. R. A. 946 (1903)
Peavy v. Georgia R. Co., 81 Ga. 485, 8 S. E. 70, 12 Am. St. Rep. 334 (1888);
Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Pelletier, 134 I11. 120, 24 N. E. 770 (1890) ; Pitts-
burgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis R. W. Co. v. Vandyne, 57 Ind. 576, 26 Am.
Rep. 68 (1877) ; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Selsor, 142 Ky. 163, 134 S. W.
143, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 165 (1911) ; Vinton v. Middlesex Railroad Co., 11
Allen, 304 (1865) ; Thayer v. Old Colony St. R. Co., 214 Mass. 234, 101 N.
E. 368, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1125, Ann. Cas. 1914 B, 865; Eads v. Metropolitan
R. Co., 43 Mo.. App. 536 (1891) ; Story v. Norfolk & S. R. Co., 133 N. C. 59,
45 S. E. 349 (1903) ; Berry v. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry., 155 N. C. 287, 71 S. E.
322 (1911) ; Edgerly v. Union St. R. Co., 67 N. H. 312, 36 Att. 558 (1893) ;
Putnam v. Broadway & Seventh Avenue R. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 108, 14 Am.
Rep. 190 (1873); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 77 S. W. 964 (Civ.
App. Tex., 1903).
42. Hines v. Miniard, 94 S. 302 (Ala., 1922); Owens v. Macon & B. R.
Co., supra; L. & N. R. Co. v. Brewer, 147 Ky. 166, 143 S. W. 1014, 39 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 64 (1911).
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demented. The safety factor is too important to run the risk that
this type of individual might become violent in the air and produce
a panic among the passengers or injure the crew.43  For the same
reasons an airline should be justified in excluding an insane per-
son even though accompanied by an attendent.
Intoxicated persons are subject to the same rule as applies to
insane persons.4 Railroads are usually required to accept a person
who is only slightly drunk,4 5 i. e., who is not disorderly and can
take care of himself, but an airline should not be compelled to
accept anyone who is even slightly drunk. The Federal Air Com-
merce Regulations provide that a pilot's license shall be subject to
revocation or suspension for "carrying passengers who are obvi-
ously under the influence of intoxicating liquor, cocaine, or other
habit-forming drugs. '"4" This clause should receive a very strict
interpretation, in view of the safety requirement, so that an air-
line may refuse to accept any person who indicates in any way
that he is even slightly under the influence of liquor or drugs.
There have been instances where passengers, who did not appear
intoxicated when boarding a plane, have become embroiled in fights
and scuffles in the air and have even attempted to climb out of
the plane. Of course, all persons do not react to such extremes
43. Meyer v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 54 Fed. 116 (1893): "The
law imposes upon a common carrier the duty of exercising a very high de-
gree of care and foresight for the safe transportation of the passengers who
intr'ist themselves to him for that purpose; and in the performance of this
duty, which the carrier cannot evade or escape, the carrier certainly has the
right to exclude from his vehicle any one whose condition is such that a
possibility of danger may be thrown upon the other passengers if he is ad-
mitted a a passenger. It would cast an unjust burden on the carrier to
hold, on the one hand, that he must exercise the highest degree of care
and caution for the protection of his passengers, and on the other hand,
to hold that he has not the right to exclude from his vehicle one whose
condition is such that he may cause danger to other passengers, simply be-
cause, at the moment he offers himself as a passenger, he is quiet, well-
behaved, or apparently harmless."
44. Pearson v. Duane, 71 U. S. 605, 615 (1866) ; Price v. St. L., I. M. &
S. Ry. Co., 75 Ark. 479, 88 S. W. 575, 112 Am. St. Rep. 79 (1905) ; Hudson
v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 178 Mass. 64, 59 N. E. 647 (1901); Freedon v. N. Y.
C. & H. R. R. Co., 24 App. Div. 306, 48 N. Y. Supp. 584 (1897) ; Pittsburgh
& Connellsville R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510, 18 Am. Rep. 424 (1874) ; Berry
v. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry., supra, Note 41; Thayer v. Old Colony St. R. Co.,
supra, Note 41; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Selsor, supra, Note 41; Vin-
ton v. Middlesex Railroad Co., supra, Note 41 ; Edgerly v. Union St. R. Co.,
supra, Note 41; Owens v. Macon & B. R. Co., supra, Note 41; Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati & St. Louis R. W. Co. v. Vandyne, supra, Note 41; Putnam v.
Broadway & Seventh Ave. R. R. Co., supra, Note 41.
45. Milliman v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 642 (1876); Paris
& G. N. Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 114 S. W. 658 (Civ. App. Tex., 1908);
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis R. W. Co. v. Vandyne, supra, Note 41;
Price v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., supra.
46. Air Commerce Regulations, 1929, Sec. 62 (H) and Sec. 74 (L).
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
when under the influence of liquor, but an airline operator cannot
be expected to determine in each case whether a man will or will
not misbehave under such circumstances.
Previous misbehavior will not ordinarily relieve the carrier of
its duty to carry where the person presents himself in a sober
and orderly condition.'7 It was held, however, in a case involving
a steamboat which operated to an island resort and provided the
only transportation system back to the mainland that, where the
previous acts of misbehavior had been consistent and numerous
and there was reason to anticipate such misbehavior again, the
carrier could refuse the person as a passenger 8 on its trip to the
island. This would seem to apply particularly to an airline which
should not be expected to run the risk of danger where cir-
cumstances give it reasonable grounds to believe that the person
applying for passage will be guilty of disorderly behavior. It
would be difficult, and sometimes dangerous, to land the plane to
eject him if he did become disorderly, and would inconvenience
others by disrupting the schedule. Where the flight is over a
large body of water it would be impossible to land the plane for
that purpose.
Diseased persons, who are likely to be repulsive to passengers,
or persons who may communicate a disease should, of course, be
refused. 49 The carrier owes the duty to its passengers not only
to protect them from dangers incident to transportation, but to
avoid placing anything among them which might injure them.
The quarters are so crowded aboard an airplane that the oppor-
tunities for contamination or repulsion are usually more immi-
nent than on board surface carriers.
A person carrying a dangerous instrumentality, such as ex-
plosives or firearms, should be excluded. 50 Airlines should be
47. Reasor v. Paducah & Illinois Ferry Co., 152 Ky. 220, 253 S. W. 222,
43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 820 (1913); Ford v. E. Louisiana R. Co., 110 La. 414,
34 S. 585; Atwater v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 55, 2 Atl. 803
(1886).
48. Stevenson v. West Seattle Land & Improvement Co., 22 Wash. 84,
60 Pac. 51 (1900) ; Note, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 820.
49. Pullman Co. v. Krauss, 145 Ala. 395, 40 S. 398, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.)
103 (1906); Bogard's Admir. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 144 Ky. 649, 139 S. W.
855, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337 (1911) ; New Orleans, Jackson & Great North-
ern R. Co. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607, 97 Am. Dec. 478 (1869); Davis v.
Kirklen, 253 S. W. 330 (Civ. App. Tex., 1923); Bruce Wyman, op. cit.,
Note 8, p. 491.
50. Dowd v. Albany Ry., 47 App. Div. 202, 62 N. Y. Supp. 179 (1900)-;
Ray v. United Traction Co., 96 N. Y. App. 48, 89 N. Y. Supp. 49 (1904).
In East India Rail Co. v. Kalidas Mukerjee [1901] A. C. 396, a passenger
carrying a small package of fireworks entered a smoking car on railroad.
The fire works became ignited resulting in the demolition of the car and
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particularly careful of this type of passengers, since any physical
disturbance in the air may cause loss of control or possible destruc-
tion of the plane, with little or no chance for the passengers or
crew to escape.
Persons carrying small animals may be excluded." They are
refused by some airlines on the grounds that the animals may
become sick and, due to the strange and crowded surroundings,
may cause discomfort or injuries to passengers. Rules usually
prohibit the carriage of reptiles or other dangerous forms of life.
However, many airlines permit the carriage of small pets where
they are properly caged. Some require that they be carried in
separate planes or compartments. But the rule has been held
reasonable that allows a railroad to refuse passage to one desiring
to bring an animal aboard. The reasons for exclusion are obvi-
ously more cogent in the case of airplanes where forced landings
would endanger or inconvenience passengers. The carriage of
large animals is generally prohibited on account of the limited
space and for the reasons already mentioned. However, there
are exceptions to this practice due to peculiarities of localities.
Thus, in the western states racing dogs are often carried, and in
the far north where the traffic depends largely on trappers, hunt-
ters, and prospectors, large dogs must necessarily be carried.
Invalids, sick persons, and cripples cannot ordinarily be ex-
cluded by surface carriers when they are able to care for them-
selves or when they are attended. 2  But if they are likely to de-
mand medical attention they may be rejected.5 8  When the carrier
the loss of several lives. Air Commerce Regulations, 1929, supra, Note 46,
Sec. 74(K) provides: "The transporting of any explosives other than that
necessary for signalling or fuel for such aircraft while in flight or material
for industrial and agricultural spraying (dusting) is prohibited, except upon
special authority obtained from the Secretary of Commerce."
51. Gregory v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co.,. 100 Ia. 385, 69 N. W. 532 (1896)
Barrett v. Malden & M. R. Co., 3 Allen. 101; Daniel v. North Jersey St.
Ry. Co., 64 N. J. L. 603, 46 At. 625 (1900); Trinity & S. R. Co. v. O'Brien,
18 Tex. Civ. App. 690, 46 S. W. 389; Wescott v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co., 41
Wash. 618, 84 Pac. 588, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 947 (1906). Rail and steam-
ship companies realized that they were losing considerable revenue by re-
fusing to accept persons carrying small pets. For the same reason airlines
are beginning to accept such persons when the animals are under proper
control.
52. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409
(1885) ; Conners v. Cunard Steamship Co., 204 Mass. 310, 90 N. E. 601, 26
L. R. A. (N. S.) 171; Mathew v. Wabash R. Co., 115 Mo. App. 468, 78 N.
W. 271, Affirmed in 199 U. S. 605, 50 L. Ed. 329 (1903); Hogan v. Nash-
ville Interurban Ry. Co., 131 Tenn. 244, 174 S. W. 1118, Ann. Cas. 1916 C,
1162 (1915).
53. Conners v. Cunard Steamship Co., supra; Conolly v. Crescent City
Ry. Co., 41 La. Ann. 57, 5 S. 259, 6 S. 526, 3 L. R. A. 133, 17 Am. St. Rep.
389 (1899).
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does not know of the existence of a passenger's ailments it owes
no particular care to the passenger more than the general high
degree of care that is owed to any other passenger.5 4 And, if
further injury occurs, the carrier becomes liable only for such
injury as is incurred in addition to the injuries already existing.55
But when the carrier accepts such a person as a passenger, with
notice of that person's condition, he is under an even greater duty
to use care toward him. 6 There are many opportunities in air-
plane flights for invalids or cripples to suffer further injuries.
Rough air may throw them about in their seats. The ship may
bounce when landing-due to errors in judgment of the pilot, a
gust of wind, or uneven ground. A forced landing for any reason,
particularly when required by law under certain conditions of the
weather, 57 gives ample opportunity for injury to one already suf-
fering from some affliction, since the plane may have to be landed
on a poor airport or in an ordinary field. In either event the
pilot's judgment cannot be expected to be as good as when he
lands on an airport with which he is thoroughly familiar. Even
when landing at a regular airport, moreover, the plane may nose
over after rolling along the ground, due to a blown tire, a rough
run-away or a number of other causes. After landing, a seaplane
may hit a partly submerged obstacle, such as a log, which would
jolt the passengers considerably. In all of the above instances
the normal person would ordinarily escape with little or no in-
jury, whereas the person suffering from some affliction might re-
ceive irremediable injuries to his health.
54. Mathew v. Wabash R. Co., supra, note 52.
55. In Mathew v. Wabash R. Co., supra, note 52, the plaintiff was
riding in one of defendant's railway cars. The defendant had no notice
that she had been and, at the time, was suffering from internal ailments.
In coupling cars the one in which plaintiff was riding was severely jolted.
This aggravated her condition to such an extent that a serious surgical
operation had to be performed resulting in irremediable injury to her. The
court held that the railroad company had been negligent in coupling the
cars and was, therefore, liable in damages for the increased injuries to
plaintiff.
But a predisposition to malarial scrofulous or rheumatic tendencies,
with accompanying good health, will not relieve the carrier from liability
to the full extent of injuries resulting from its negligence. Louisville, New
Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Falvey, supra, note 52, p. 426.
56. Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Derry, 47 Colo. 584, 108 Pac. 172, 27 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 761 (1910); Ill. C. R. Co. v. Allen, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 108, 89
S. W. 150 (1905); Croorn v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 52 Minn. 296, 53 N.
W. 1128 (1893) ; Yazoo & M. N. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, 88 S. 1 (Miss., 1921)_;
Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Sears, 210 S. W. 684 (Civ. App. Tex., 1919) ;
Bogard's Admir. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., supra, note 49; Pearson v. Duane,
supra, note 44; Price v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., supra, note 44.
57. Air Commerce Regulations, 1929, Sec. 74 (b) as amended Sept. 19,
1930, and Sec. 79 as amended Dec. 31, 1930.
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There have been many instances in all parts of the country
in which invalids, going to hospitals for treatments, especially
desire to travel by plane because air travel is less tiring for them
than travel aboard ground carriers. There are so many times that
an airline can render this highly commendable and humane ser-
vice that the courts ought to be very lenient in applying the strict
rules of common carrier liability in such cases. However, in the
absence of changes in the law, the air carrier will be subject to a
great legal risk in carrying ailing persons.
Blind persons fall within the same category as cripples and
invalids, and it has been held that a railroad could exclude them
unless attended, because they are incapable of caring for them-
selves, being dependent on employees of the carrier or chance ac-
quaintances among passengers for assistance.58 The objections
have usually arisen in railroad cases where a change of trains was
necessary. However, it has also been held to be a question of fact
under the circumstances whether a blind person was able to look
after himself without an attendant. 9  Aboard an airplane it might
become exceedingly uncomfortable to other passengers if an unat-
tended blind person became ill and unable to locate the facilities
supplied for passengers in that condition. Furthermore, in board-
ing or alighting from the plane there is imposed a greater degree
of responsibility on the agents of the carrier to keep a blind per-
son from placing himself in danger of the propellers of the plane
or other hazardous situations on the ground. Unless they are
accompanied, therefore, it would seem advisable to permit their
exclusion as a general rule. But this, of course, is subject to the
circumstances attending each particular case, it being a question
of fact as to whether the person applying for passage is capable
of caring for himself.
An unaccompanied person, so old as to be incapable of caring
for himself, comes within the rule applicable to invalids and may
be excluded if the circumstances justify it.60 Also an unattended
child of tender years may be rejected because it places an added
responsibility on the carrier."1 But neither a child nor an old per-
58. Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Derry, supra, note 56; 11. C. R. Co. v.
Allen, supra, note 56.
59. Zachery v. Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 75 Miss. 746, 23 S. 434, 41 L. R.
A. 385, 65 Am. St. Rep. 617 (1898); Ill. C. R. Co. v. Smith, 85 Miss. 349,
37 S. 643, 70 L. R. A. 642, 107 Am. St. Rep. 293 (1905) ; Dowd v. Albany Ry.,
supra, note 50.
60. Croom v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., supra, note 56.
61. Yaoo & M. N. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, supra, note 56.
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son should be excluded merely -because of age.82 Everyone has a
right to be carried and as long as he is otherwise capable of travel-
ling he should be taken. It is practically certain that neither of
the above are likely to discommode other passengers or affect the
safety element aboard an airplane.
Immoral persons cannot be excluded merely for that reason.
It has been held that a railroad is not the custodian of the morals
of its passengers and unless misbehavior occurs aboard it has no
right to exclude a person whom it may believe to be immoral. 8
There seems to be no reason why the same rule should not apply
with equal force to airlines.
Professional gamblers have been rightfully excluded by rail-
roads because they are not upon lawful and legitimate business."'
However, a passenger aboard a modern airliner would ordinarily
have little opportunity to carry on an extensive gambling opera-
tion. As long as the reason does not exist on an airliner the rule
against exclusion for previous misconduct operates and he should
be carried.
Officers with prisoners might be unobjectionable as passengers
except that their presence, due to the close quarters, would pos-
sibly be repulsive to persons riding in the same plane. Prisoners
must be transported and as long as they do not tend to interfere
with the safety of the plane or the comfort of the passengers they
should not be refused.6 5 However, they should be excluded if
there is any indication that they might try to escape. It is alto-
gether conceiveable that a prisoner might wrest control of the plane
from the pilot. In most cases he would probably be afraid to try
to make his escape while in the air. However, there is cogent
reason to support a rule which refuses the transportation'of prison-
ers in custody. The possibility that the prisoner might obtain
possession of the officer's weapon and compel the pilot to navigate
the plane to a wrong destination justifies the practice.
Fugitives from justice should not be carried. The carrier oper-
ates under the law and cannot be required to break it by aiding or
abetting a person accused of crime6
62. Croom v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., supra, note 56; Yazoo & M. N.
R. Co. v. O'Keefe, supra, note 56.
63. Brown v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 5 Fed. 499 (Tenn., 1880).
64. Thurston v. Union Pac. R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 14019 (Neb., 1877).
65. Bruce Wyman, op. cit., note 8, p. 520. But the carrier owes its
passengers the duty to protect them from assault. Brunswick v. Ponder, 117
Ga. 63, 43 S. E. 430, 60 L. R. A. 713, 97 Am. St. Rep. 152 (1903).
66. Thurston v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra, note 64.
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A thief need not be carried.6 7 The carrier has a duty to pro-
tect its passengers which permits it to exclude those whom it has
reason to believe might rob the travellers.
Since the carrier owes a duty to protect its passengers, it
should exclude those going aboard to assault a passenger or a
member of the crew.68 Similarly, it has a right to exclude anyone
going aboard with the intention of violating a reasonable regu-
lation"9 since the regulations are made so as to better carry out
the carrier's duty to serve the public. In either of these instances
the safety or comfort factors will be imperiled.
Business solicitors may be refused. 0 Thus, any person may
be excluded when his object in boarding the plane of the carrier
is to solicit business among passengers or to discourage them from
travelling aboard the carrier's planes. The latter has rights of
private property of which individuals may not deprive him by
such practices.
Aliens must generally be carried. The provision of the 14th
Amendment requiring equal protection of the laws includes them."
They should, of course, be excluded if to accept them would violate
an immigration law. Thus, where an expectant mother seeks to
take passage in order to be over or upon foreign soil when her
child is born, in order to give it a different nationality, a close
question arises as to whether the immigration laws will be vio-
lated.7 2  Of course, if the danger of illness enroute and the need
for medical attention is imminent, she could be excluded on that
ground.
One other type of individual requires some consideration.
The occasions are very few, but sometimes an abnormally pro-
portioned person applies for passage on an airline. An airplane
is limited by the weight which it can carry and by the number
67. Supra.
68. Britton v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air-Line Ry Co., 88 N. C. 536
(1882); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Birchfield, 105 Va. 809, 54 S. E. 789
(1906) ; Brunswick v. Ponder, supra, note 65; Thurston v. Union Pacific R.
Co., supra, note 64.
69. Renaud v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 210 Mass. 553, 97 N. E. 98,
38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 689 (1911) ; Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp.,
supra, note 30.
70. Barney v. The D. R. Martin, Fed. Cas. No. 1030 (N. Y., 1873);
Jencks v. Coleman, 13 Fed. Cas No. 7258 (R. I., 1835) ; Commonwealth v.
Power, 7 Metc. 596 (1844); Barry v. Oyster Bay & Huntington Steamboat
Co., 67 N. Y. 301, 23 Am. Rep. 115 (1876).
71. See note 81, infra.
72. See Frank Stewart, "A Ship's Doctor Talks About His Job", in
the American Magazine, Aug., 1932, pp. 53, 87-88.
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of passengers who can be accommodated. For this reason the
seats provided are sufficient to carry an average-sized individual
weighing not over 175 or 200 pounds, although larger persons can
sit comfortably in them. But where a person weighs 300 pounds
or more, or is abnormally tall, he will not only find seating ar-
rangements uncomfortable for himself but will also discommode
others in the plane. In some types of planes, where the seats fit
close together, he may inconvenience others by having to occupy
practically two seats. Or his added weight may require that one
less of the number of passengers allowed be accommodated. In
one case he may discommode other passengers, and in the other
he may deprive the carrier of additional revenue which is a de-
privation of property. However, it is questionable whether these
reasons would permit the exclusion of this type of individual un-
less the plane were already so loaded that his additional weight
would exceed that permitted by governmental or company regula-
tions for the particular plane. In every case, it would be a ques-
tion to be determined by the surrounding circumstances. The
same would be true of Siamese twins or others so deformed as
to require more space than average persons.
Persons who accompany others who are excluded may not
themselves be rejected unless it is necessary that they remain with
the excluded persons.7 3  Thus, a parent would be required to re-
main with an unruly child, as would an attendant with an invalid,
insane, or blind person, and a nurse or doctor with a patient.
Obviously, a person may be ejected when circumstances come
into existence after his admission which would have justified his
exclusion when he applied for passage, had they existed at that
time. 74
Other instances may arise where persons may be lawfully re-
fused, but in all cases the tests for determining whether the right
to exclude exists are: Will the carrier be deprived of his prop-
erty rights without a corresponding benefit to the public? Will
it inconvenience or cause discomfort and confusion to the passen-
gers? Will it reduce the safety afforded by the carrier? Will it
increase the carrier's duty above that which it owes as a common
carrier of passengers? Will it violate a law, or a reasonable regu-
lation of the carrier?
73. Braun v. N. P. Ry. Co., 79 Minn. 404, 82 N. W. 675, 49 L. R. A.
319, 79 Am. St. Rep. 497 (1900) ; Bruce Wyman, op. cit. note 8, p. 525.
74. Ibid., p. 515.
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Racial Discrimination.
Prior to the Civil War, the negro's rights were so limited that
public service companies were seldom troubled with the problem
of discrimination on account of color. Colonial statutes provided
that a liberated slave should be bound out by the colony for further
service.7 5  However, before the Emancipation Proclamation, there
were a great many free negroes in both the north and the south.76
tut the courts held that a man of African descent, whether slave
or free man, was not and could not become a citizen of a state
or of the United States."7 An individual's rights depended so
much upon his being a citizen that these free negroes were sub-
ject to being discriminated against without legal redress.
In 1861, a Pennsylvania case held that a city railroad's regula-
tion was reasonable, which prohibited colored persons from enter-
ing the body of the cars and which compelled them to ride on the
platforms.78  In 1858, a Michigan case reached a similar result.
A steamboat company operating from Detroit to Toledo had a
regulation, which the court held to be reasonable, that colored per-
sons could take deck passage but cou!d not take cabin passage,
which was reserved for white persons. White passengers were
also accepted for deck passage. 79  Although the latter case is often
cited, probably neither of them can be accepted as authority since
the adoption of the 14th Amendment.
14th Amendment and Federal Protection of Civil Rights.
After the Civil War, the 13th Amendment prevented slavery,
but the onerous position of the negroes remained unchanged, 0 and
75. Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts (Pa.) 553 (1837).
76. Corporation Commission v. Interracial Commission, 198 N. C. 317,
151 S. E. 648 (1930).
77. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393; Amy, a woman of color v.
Smith, 1 Litt. (Ky.) 210 (1832); 11 C. J. 801.
78. Goines v. M'Candless. 4 Phila. Rep. 255 (1861).
79. "As the duty to carry is imposed by law for the convenience of
the community at large, and not of individuals, except so far as they are a
component part of the community, the law would defeat its own object
if it required the carrier, for the accommodation of particular individuals,
to incommode the community at large. He may do so if he chooses, but
the law does not impose it on him as a duty. It does not require a carrier
to make any rules whatever, but if he deems it for his interest to do so,
looking to an increase of passengers from the superior accommodations
he holds out to the public, to deny him the right would be an interference
with a carrier's control over his own property in his own way, not neces-
sary to the performance of his duty to the public as a carrier". Day v.
Owen, 5 Mich. 520, 527, 72 Am. Dec. 62 (1858).
80. "They were in some states forbidden to appear in towns in any
other character than menial servants. They were required to reside on
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the effect of the Dred Scott decision was still unremoved. The
14th Amendment was thereafter adopted in 1868. It alleviated
the effect of the Dred Scott case by providing that "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside." This clause, of itself, places colored per-
sons in the same position as any other person rightfully claiming
to be a citizen. Therefore, the same common law rules heretofore
discussed apply to colored persons and to white persons alike.
Consequently, for relief against any infringement of his rights as
a citizen the negro has his legal remedy.
The 14th Amendment, however, went further. It provided, in
the same section, that "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; . . . nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." This clause is, in a
measure, superfluous since it is practically a repetition of the previ-
ous clause. However, the word "person" gives it a broader sig-
nificance since the term includes those who are not citizens. Con-
sequently, an alien is protected and cannot be discriminated against
by a common carrier under protection of a state law.8'
In its endeavor to protect the rights of colored persons, Con-
gress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which provided:82
Section 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and p-ivileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the
conditions established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race
and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section
• . shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay the sum of $500 to
the person aggrieved thereby . . . and shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor.
The famous Civil Rights Cases88 decided in 1883, however,
declared the foregoing sections of the act to be invalid as an exten-
and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or own it.' They were
excluded from many occupations of gain, and were not permitted to give
testimony in the courts in any case where a white man was a party".
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall, 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872).
81. Wick Yo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220
(1885): An alien is a "person" within meaning of the 14th Amendment
and is entitled to the equal protection of the laws. Prowd v. Gore, 52 Cal.
App. 458, 207 P. 490 (1922): The word "citizen" in Civil Rights statute
held to include aliens since it would otherwise violate 14th amendment.
82. 18 Stat. at Large 335-336.
83. 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
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sion of power by Congress not authorized by the 14th Amendment,
which merely prohibited discriminatory action by the states. It
sought to inflict a penalty for violation of a right belonging to a
citizen of a state and not for the violation of a right of a citizen
of the United States. The right of the Federal government to
afford protection under the Amendment exists only after a state
has refused this protection.84 A state may act through its legisla-
ture, its administrative officers, or its judiciary.8 Consequently, if
a state court enforces a discriminatory regulation of a carrier the
aggrieved party may appeal to the Federal Courts. Or, if -the dis-
crimination is by the state legislature or a state administrative
body, a federal question arises in the first instance.8 6
Where the requisite conditions exist for suing in the Federal
Courts, such as diversity of citizenship, a colored citizen may
claim, in such courts, his common law rights not to be discrim-
inated against by a common carrier just as can a white citizen.
Although there is no Federal common law, the Federal Courts
will adopt and enforce the common law (or civil code) of the state
wherein the right claimed is alleged to be violated, the reason being
practical necessity and convenience. 8
Recourse may also be had in the Federal Courts by virtue of
a Congressional Act providing a penalty for any one committing
an act under authority of a state law which contravenes the inten-
tion of the 14th Amendment.8 The Federal Courts may also
enjoin such an act.8
States Civil Rights Statutes.
Following the failure of the Federal Civil Rights Act the
States were encouraged to take the matter into their own hands.90
84. Supra; Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. Ed. 667 (1879);
Cully v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3466 (1876); Thompson
v. Baltimore C. P. R. Co., 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,941, reported only by court
in 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3466; Brawner v. Irwin, 169 Fed. 964 (1909) ; Note, 14
L. R. A. 579.
85. Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 33 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 312, 57 L. Ed. 510 (1912); Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Con-
stitutional Law of the United States, p. 247 (1929).
86. Raymond v. Chicago Union T. Co., 207 U. S. 20, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7,
52 L. Ed. 78 (1907).
87. Platt v. Lecocq, supra, note 31; Westel Woodbury Willoughby, op.
cit., note 85, pp. 998-1000.
88. R. S. §5510; Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, §20; 35 Stat. 1092; 18 U. S. C. A.§52. 89. Home Teleph. & Teleg. Co., supra, note 85.
90. Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, "Separation of the Races in Public
Conveyances", 3 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 180 (1909).
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New York had already, in 1881, enacted a statute which was prac-
tically the same as the Federal Act. 1 Ohio followed in 1884,"2
reducing the penalty to $100. In 1885, a number of states en-
acted Civil Rights Statutes with provisions similar to that of the
Congressional Act. They were Nebraska,
9
3 Indiana,94 Illinois, 5
Rhode Island,96 Michigan, 97 Pennsylvania"" and Connecticut. 9
In all states except in the south, in which there is now an
appreciably large negro population, there are Civil Rights statutes
of substantially the same context as the Federal Act, except for
certain amendments not affecting common carriers. 00 However,
they vary somewhat in their terminology so that in the case of many
it is very doubtful if they apply to airlines. Thus, the Illinois
statute specifies "railroads, omnibuses, stages, street cars, boats,
funeral hearses and public conveyances on land and water, and
all other places of public accommodation. . . ."101 Under the
rule of ejusdem generis a statute will be construed so that "after
an enumeration of certain places of business on which a duty is
91. New York Law, 1881, vol. i, p. 541.
92. Laws of Ohio, 1884, pp. 15-16.
93. Laws of Nebraska, 1885, p. 393.
94. Acts of Indiana, 1885, p. 76.
95. Laws of Illinois, 1885.
96. Rhode Island Acts and Resolves, 1884-85, p. 171.
97. Acts of Michigan, 1885, p. 131.
98. Laws of Pennsylvania, 1887, pp. 1720-1721.
99. Connecticut Pub. Acts, 1905, p. 323.
100. Civil Code of California, §§51-52, as amended, 1923 (Enacted
1901) ; Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921, §§ 4128-4129 (Enacted 1895) ; Gen-
eral Statutes of Connecticut 1930, §§5985 and 6065; Illinois, Smith-Hurd Ch.
38, §§125, 126, as amended, June 5, 1911 (Enacted 1885) ; Burns Annotated
Indiana Statutes 1926, §§4633, 4634; Code of Iowa, 1927, §§13251, 13252
(Enacted 1897) ; Revised Statutes of Kansas 1923, 21-2424; General Laws of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1921, Ch. 272, §98; Michigan, Pub.
Acts 1931, No. 328, §§146, 147; Mason's Minnesota Statutes 1927, §7321;
Compiled Statutes of Nebraska 1929, 23-101, 102 (Enacted 1893) ; Cumula-
tive Supplement of the Compiled Statutes of New Jersey 1911-1924, §39-
1, 2, P. L. 1884, p. 339; As amended L. 1917, c. 106, p. 220; L. 1921, c. 174,
p. 468; Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York 1930, Ch. 41, §514 (As
amended by L. 1918, ch. 380, Sept. 1) ; Throckmorton's 1930 Annotated Code
of Ohio, §12940 (91 v. 17, §2; 81 v. 90, §1) ; Purdon's Pennsylvania Stat-
utes (1930) §1211 (1887, May 19, P. L. 130, §) ; General Laws of Rhode
Island, 1923, Ch. 395, §28 (6040) (29 R. I. 33); Remington's Compiled Stat-
utes of Washington (1922) §2686 (L. '09, p. 1027, §434) ; Wisconsin Stat-
utes 1929, 1895 c. 223; Stats. 1898 s. 4398 c.; 1925 c. 4.
101. Supra, §125. See also the following statutes which probably do
not apply to airlines: Compiled Laws of Colorado 1921, supra, §4128;
Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes 1926, supra, §4633. Revised Statutes of
Kansas 1923, supra; Michigan, supra; Cumulative Supplement of the Com-
piled Statutes of New Jersey, 1911-1924, supra, §39-1; Throckmorton's
1930 Annotated Code of Ohio, supra; Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes 1930,
supra; General Laws of Rhode Island, 1923, supra, §28; Wisconsin Statutes
1929, supra.
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imposed or a license required, and the same statute then employs
general terms to embrace other cases, no other cases will be in-
cluded within the general term except those of the same character
or kind as specifically enumerated.' 10 2 An airline is not a public
conveyance on "land and water," and hence cannot be classed as
the same general kind of conveyance. Nor was it within the con-
templation of the legislature when the statute was passed, since
aviation was practically undreamed of at that time.
Hnvever, where the statutes specify merely " public convey-
ances" or "common carriers," without additional elaboration, air-
lines would probably be included in their inhibitions. 0 3
State Civil Rights statutes have generally been held constitu-
tional as not in contravention of the 14th amendment requiring
that no one be deprived of property without due process of law.' 0 '
And there seems to be no reason why they should not be upheld
as a valid exercise of a police power when applied to interstate
commerce, since they merely penalize that which is already un-
lawful. However, a statute enacted by the "carpet-bag" legis-
lature in Louisiana, which prohibited, not only any discrimination
but also any distinction between accommodations for colored and
white persons on common carriers, was held to violate the Com-
merce clause of the Constitution.
A colored woman boarded a steamboat at a point on the Mis-
sissippi River in Louisiana for passage to another point in the
same state. The vessel was registered as a United States ship
and plied between Vicksburg, Mississippi, and New Orleans, Lou-
isiana. The Supreme Court of the United States based its decision
on the holding of the state court which had decided that the
statute applied to interstate commerce and held that, since it tended
toward a lack of' uiformity, it unreasonably burdened commerce
102. Cecil v. Green, 161 Ill. 265, 43 N. W. 1105, 32 L. R. A. 566 (1896)
holds that the term "and all other places of accommodation and amuse-
ment" in Illinois Statute does not include soda fountain in drug 'store.
But in Youngstown Str. Ry. v. Tokus, 4 Ohio App. 276 (1915) a similar
provision in the Ohio statute was held to apply to a public dancing pavilion
because the court construed it to be the intention of the legislature to
include such places.
103. Civil Code of California, supra, note 100 §51; General Statutes of
Connecticut 1930, supra, note 100, §5985; Code of Iowa 1927, supra, note 100,
§13251; General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 1921, supra,
note 100; Mason's Minnesota Statutes 1927, supra, note 100; Compiled Stat-
utes of Nebraska 1929, supra, note 100, 23-101; Cahill's Consolidated Laws
of New York, 1930, supra, note 100; Remington's Compiled Statutes of
Washington (1922) supra, note 100.
104. Baylies v. Curry, 21 N. E. 595 (I1l., 1889) ; Donnell v. State, 48
Miss. 661 (1873) ; People v. King, 18 N. E. 245 (N. Y. 1888).
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between the states. "' The inference drawn from the opinion of
the court is that the same construction would be given a state
statute which required separate compartments for white and col-
ored persons.1 6 Consequently, its main effect has been to deter
state action in passing Jim Crow laws applicable to interstate com-
merce.
Jim Crow Statutes.
The term "Jim Crow" does not refer to the color of negroes
and is in no way derogatory to the colored race. It was the name
given one of the early popular minstrel songs. About 1841, it was
used to designate a negro coach on a railroad in Massachusetts. 0 T
Before the enactment of the Jim Crow laws, carriers operat-
ing in the south already had regulations requiring the separation
of white and colored passengers. 0 8 The laws, therefore, were
not intended strictly to enforce separation but merely legalized
an existing custom. 10 The same separation is enforced in public
schools" 0 even in northern states, prisons, and housing facilities.
Most states also prohibit miscegenous marriages. The United
States Army finds it advisable to separate the colored from white
troops. This separation is for the welfare of both races.
The first Jim Crow laws were enacted by Florida and Mis-
sissippi in 1865' and by Texas in 1866.12 In 1870, Georgia en-
acted a statute requiring equal accommodations."' In 1871, Texas
repealed the law of 1866 and enacted a statute similar to that of
Louisiana declared unconstitutional in Hall v. DeCuir.14  Ar-
kansas required equial accommodations by statute enacted in 1874. 15
105. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547 (La., 1877); Acts of
Louisiana, 1873, pp. 156-157.
106. L. N. 0. &.T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587 (1890).
107. Century Dictionary & Cyclopedia (1911 ed.).
108. Hall v. DeCuir, supra, note 105; Derry v. Lowry, 6 Phila. Rep.
30 (1865) ; Westchester & Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles, 55 Penn.
State Rep. 209 (1867); Pleasants v. North Beach & Mission R. Co., 34
Calif. 586; Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185,
8 Am. Rep. 641 (1870) ; Coger v. North West Union Packet Co., 37 Ia. 145(1873).
109. Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, loc. cit., note 90, p. 189.
110. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405; Cory v. Carter, 48
Ind. 337, 17 Am. Rep. 738; Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198; State
v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 8 Am. Rep. 713; P. v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 44
Am. R. 232; Games v. McCann, 21 Ohio 198.
111. Laws of Florida, 1865, p. 25; Laws of Mississippi, 1865, pp. 231-
232.
112. Laws of Texas, 1866, p. 67.
113. Georgia Laws, 1870, pp. 427-428.
114. Texas Laws, 1871, 2d session, p. 16.
115. Code of Arkansas, 1874, sec. 764, p. 259.
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Other states might have enacted Jim Crow laws earlier, except
for the Reconstruction regimes."'
The first Jim Crow law, as they exist today, was enacted by
Tennessee in 1881.7 Florida followed in 1887;118 Mississippi
in 1888 ;119 Texas in 1889 ;120 Louisiana in 1890,121 and Alabama, 1 2
Kentucky,"2 3 Arkansas 124 and Georgia in 1891.125 After an interval
of several years there followed South Carolina in 1898 ;126 North
Carolina ' 7 and Virginia in 1899;128 and Maryland in 1904.12
The early Jim Crow Statutes were enacted with particular
reference to railroads and did not, in most instances, include city
street car lines. In many states, however, city ordinances re-
quired separation of passengers on street-cars and after 1900
statutes were passed requiring such segregation. 30 In only one
statute were steamboats included.'3
Jim Crow statutes now exist in all southern states except Mis-
souri. The Alabama statute is fairly typical:132
"All railroads carrying passengers in this state, other than street
railroads, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white
and colored races, by providing two or more passenger cars for each
passenger train, or by dividing the passenger cars by partitions, so as to
secure separate accommodations."
Penalties for violation are provided against company, conductor,
and passenger generally.
Most such statutes exclude from their operation nurses ac-
coinpanying persons of opposite race or color, officers in charge
of prisoners, and employees of the railroad.
Statutes and ordinances governing the separation of passen-
116. For entire historical discussion see Gilbert Thomas Stephenson,
loc. cit., note 90, and same author in 43 Am. Law Rev. 695 (1909), "Race
Distinctions in American Law".
117. Laws of Tennessee, 1881, pp. 211-212.
118. Laws of Florida, 1887, p. 116.
119. Laws of Mississippi, 1888, pp. 45, 48.
120. Laws of Texas, 1889, pp. 132-133.
121. Laws of Louisiana, 1890, pp. 152-154.
122. Laws of Alabama, 1891, p. 412.
123. Laws of Kentucky, 1891, pp. 63, 64.
124. Laws of Arkansas, 1891, pp. 15-17.
125. Laws of Georgia, 1891, 1, 157-158; 1899, pp. 66-67.
126. Laws of South Carolina, 1898, pp. 778-779.
127. Laws of North Carolina, 1899, pp. 539-540.
128. Laws of Virginia, 1899-1900, pp. 236-237.
129. Laws of Maryland, 1904, pp. 187-188.
130. Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, "Separation of the Races in Public
Conveyances", 3 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 180, 199 (1909).
131. Laws of North Carolina, supra, note 127.
132. Code of Alabama, 1923, Sec. 9968.
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gers on street-cars usually permit their separation by assignments
to seats in opposite ends of the cars.13 3
Since bus companies do not fall within the statutes,'3 ' sev-
eral states have enacted laws which specifically require separation
on buses. The Louisiana statute provides :'15
"All bus companies, corporations, partnerships, persons or associations of
persons carrying passengers for hire in their buses, carriages, or vehicles
in this state shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white
and colored races designating separate seats or compartments so as to
secure separate accommodations for the white and colored races; no per-
son or persons shall be permitted to occupy seats or compartments other
than the ones assigned to them on account of the race they belong to."
Georgia has a law framed in the following language:"'
"Motor common carriers may confine themselves to carrying either white
or colored passengers, or they may provide different motor vehicles for
carrying white and colored passengers; and they may carry white and
colored passengers in the same vehicle but only under such conditions of
separation of the races as the Commission may prescribe."
The North Carolina Code contains a provision similar to that
in the Georgia statute," 7 exempting bus lines which carry for one
race only. It is doubtful, however, if either of these statutes
would be upheld as constitutional.3 " The 14th Amendment par-
ticularly provides against a state making any discriminatory law,
and there can be no question that a carrier, if it meets the require-
ments of being a common carrier, does discriminate if it carries
for one class of persons only.3 0
There are no Jim Crow statutes which apply directly to air-
lines. However, in a recent case involving a statute which gave
the North Carolina Corporation Commission general powers to
regulate intrastate bus lines, 40 it was held that the Commission had
133. Laws of Arkansas, Act. Mar. 27, 1903, p. 178, §1; Crawford &
Moses, Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas, 1921, §998.
134. Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., supra, note 30, p. 365;
Patillo v. State, 47 S. W. (2d) 847 (Crim. App. Tex., 1932).
135. Act 207, 1928, p. 272, Section 1; Robert H. .Marr, Criminal Stat-
utes of Louisiana (1929), p. 226; see also, Statutes of Oklahoma, 1931, secs.
9332, 9355, and 9336; Virginia Code of 1930, §4097Z.
136. 1931 Code Supplement, Sec. 1770 (60-LLL.).
137. North Carolina Code of 1931, §2613.
138. A. W. Gholson, Jr., "Separate and Equal Accommodations in
Motor Busses", 8 N. C. L. Rev. 455 (1929-30).
139. McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep.
69, 59 L. Ed. 169 (1914).
140. §7, Ch. 136, P. L. 1927, "The Commission is hereby vested with
power and authority to supervise and regulate every motor vehicle carrier
under this article; to make or approve rates, fares, charges, classifications,
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the power to require separation of white and colored passengers
on the grounds that the bus line was required to possess a charter
to operate, and because the general policy of the state required
such segregation. 4" Consequently, where a state statute is con-
strued to give an administrative body powers to regulate intrastate
airlines, the same result may be reached whereby airlines would
be required to separate white and colored passengers. 42
Jim Crow statutes have been held to be a valid exercise of the
police power.143 They are not in contravention of the 14th Amend-
ment as depriving of the equal protection of the laws, because
negroes are not more discriminated against than are white per-
sons. The equality of right secured by the Constitution does not
demand identity of rights.
There is no deprivation of property without due process of
law, because the right to be carried is a civil right and not a right
of property. And the equal rights and privileges clause is not
violated, because the law applies to all alike. Some contention has
been made that they violate the 13th Amendment but there is no
basis for this, since it merely prohibits slavery.
There is some conflict of authority as to whether a Jim Crow
law can operate on interstate transportation lines. The greater
number of state supreme court and Federal lower court decisions
hold that, in the light of Hall v. DeCuir,14 such laws are uncon-
rules, and regulations for service and safety of operation and checking
baggage of each such motor vehicle carrier; to supervise the operation of
union passenger stations in any manner necessary to promote harmony
among the operators and efficiency of service to the travelling public;
• . . to require the increase of equipment capacity to meet public con-
venience and necessity; and to supervise and regulate motor vehicle carriers
in all other matters affecting the relationship between such carriers and the
traveling and shipping public. The Commission shall have the power and
authority, by general order or otherwise, to prescribe rules and regulations
applicable to any and all motor vehicle carriers .
141. Corporation Commission v. Interracial Commission, supra, note 76;
A. W. Gholson, Jr., loc. cit., note 138.
142. See Fred D. Fagg, J. and Abraham Fishman, loc. cit., Note 6, App. C.
143. L. N. 0. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, supra. note 106; Plessy v.
Ferguson 163 U. S. 537 (La., 1896) ; McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co.,
supra, note 139; Anderson v. L. & N. R. Co., 62 Fed. 46 (C. C. Ky., 1894)
Ohio Val. Ry's. Receiver v. Lander, 104 Ky. 431, 47 S. W. 344 (1898).
144. Supra, note 105, pp. 497-8. "Mississippi may require the steamer
carrying passengers to provide two cabins and tables for passengers, and
may make it a penal offense for white and colored persons to be mixed
in the same cabin or at the same table. If Louisiana may pass a law for-
bidding such steamer from having two cabins and two tables-one for white
and the other for colored persons-it must be admitted that Mississippi
may pass a law requiring all passenger steamers entering her ports to have
separate cabins and tables, and make it penal for white and colored persons
to be accommodated in the same cabin or to be furnished with meals at
the same table. Should state legislation in that regard conflict, then the
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stitutional as placing an undue burden on interstate commerce,
and that Congress, not having occupied the field, indicates by its
silence that this field should be left unregulated. 14
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that the Jim Crow
law of that state1 46 applies to interstate passengers.147  The court
distinguished the case from Hall v. DeCuir because the facts dif-
fered, and contended that nothing in the Federal Constitution was
abrogated. However, this case has had a minority following.1 8
A New York case, decided three years previous to the Tennessee
case, held that the same Tennessee statute was violative of the
Constitution insofar as it applied to interstate commerce.
4
1
A more recent case has held that the Kentucky Jim Crow
law was applicable to an interurban electric line incorporated under
the laws of Kentucky.and operating under a Kentucky franchise
steamer must cease to navigate between ports of the States having such
conflicting legislation, or must be exposed to penalties at every trip.
"Those who framed the Constitution never intended that navigation,
whether foreign or among the States, should be exposed to such conflicting
legislation; and it was to save those who follow that pursuit from such
exposure and embarrassment that the power to regulate such commerce
was vested exclusively in Congress."
145. L. N. 0. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, supra, note 106, p. 589; Chesa-
peake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101, 45
L. Ed. 244 (1900); McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., supra, note 139; Ab-
bott v. Hicks, 11 S. 74 (La., 1892) ; Hart v. State, 100 Md. 595, 60 A. 457
(1905); Carey v. Spencer, 36 N. Y. Supp. 886 (1895); Ohio Val. Ry's. Re-
ceiver v. Lander, supra, note 143; Anderson v. L. & N. R. Co., supra, note
143; D. Newton Baker, "Segregation of White and Colored Passengers on
Interstate Trains", 19 Y. L. J. 445 (1909-10) ; John C. Doolan, "Validity of
Separate Coach Laws When Applied to Interstate Passengers", I Va. L. R.
379, 385 (1914).
146. Acts 1891, c, 52.
147. Smith v. State, 100 Tenn. 494, 46 S. W. 566, 41 L. R. A. 432 (1898).
148. In Alabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Morris, 60 S. 11, 14 (Miss., 1912)
the court said: "A riot upon an interstate train growing out of the refusal
of common carriers to recognize a situation known to every Mississippian-
black and white-would endanger the lives and disturb the peace of all
passengers on the train, intrastate and interstate; and we therefore decline
to limit the applicability of the statute to intrastate commerce. Possessing
the knowledge of local conditions common to all residents of our section,
we confess some surprise that there was no sequel to the evcnt described
by the record."
"One more observation: If we should hold that the statute is in-
applicable to interstate travelers, it seems to us that necessarily it must be
condemned altogether, as the theory upon which its wisdom and justice
rests will thus be declared fanciful and without foundation in fact. If the
peculiar conditions existing here demanded this legislation to conserve
the peace of the state and our lawmakers have so decided, the mere fact
that the passenger is gonig out of the state, coming into the state from
without, or travelling across the state, does not alter the complexion of
affairs, nor render the danger less, should a negro or white man be re-
quired against his will to occupy a car with passengers of another race."
See also, Southern R. Co. v. Norton, 112 Miss. 302, 73 S. 1 (1916).
149. Carey v. Spencer, supra, note 145.
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a line from South Covington to Covington, a distance of five
miles, and a total distance of ten miles from South Covington to
Cincinnati, Ohio. 150 Eighty per cent of its passengers were inter-
state. The United States Supreme Court based its decision on the
ground that the acceptance of a franchise from the State com-
pelled the carrier to obey the state's laws and said: "An inter-
urban railroad company deriving its powers from the state, and
subject to obligations under the laws of the state, should not be
permitted to exercise the powers given by the state, and escape
its obligations to the State, under the circumstances presented by
this record, by running its coaches beyond state lines." Justice
Day dissented on the grounds that such a short distance was
traversed in Kentucky and such a small percentage of the busi-
ness conducted there that the additional expense would unduly
burden interstate commerce.
Several cases involving the question of the interstate applica-
tion of Jim Crow laws have reached the United States Supreme
Court. However, the issue has always been evaded, usually be-
cause the State courts had previously held the statute to apply only
to intrastate travel or because the federal court did not feel dis-
posed to so construe it that it would apply to interstate carriage.
The court has been very careful to avoid a direct decision of the
question, but, from its frequent comments that the statutes applied
only to intrastate travel and, therefore, raised no question of con-
stitutionality, it is fair to surmise that the high court might decide
against their validity if squarely confronted by the proposition. 1 5
150. South Covington & C. St. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 64 L. Ed. 631.
151. L. N. 0. & T. R. Co. v. Mississippi, supra, note 106; Plessy v.
Ferguson, supra, note 143; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kentucky, supra,
note 145; McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., supra, note 139.
In the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 398 (1913) the court said:
"The grant in the Constitution of its own force, that is, without action
by Congress, established the essential immunity of interstate commercial
intercourse from the direct control of the States with respect to those
subjects embraced within the grant which are of such a nature as to demand
that if regulated at all, their regulation should be prescribed by a single
authority. It has repeatedly been declared by this court that as to those
subjects which rLquire a general system or uniformity of regulation the
power of Congress is exclusive. In other matters, admitting of diversity
of treatment according to the special requirements of local conditions, the
States may act within their respective jurisdictions until Congress does act;
and, when Congress does act, the exercise of its authority overrides all con-
flicting state legislation.
"The principle, which determines this classification, underlies the doc-
trine that the States cannot under any guise impose direct burdens upon
interstate commerce. For this is but to hold that the states are not per-
mitted directly to regulate or restrain that which from its nature should
be under the control of the one authority and be free from restriction save
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On the other hand, if the Supreme Court should follow its
decision in the South Covington case and extend that doctrine to
interstate carriers covering a wider territory, then the state's power
to enact interstate Jim Crow laws is very nearly complete, as long
as Congress does not intercede.
Where a state, through its administrative body, may compel
intrastate airlines to provide separate accommodations for white
and colored passengers, it may also require such airlines which
extend their lines into other states to separate interstate passengers
as well, if the South Covington case is accepted as authority. We
must consider that an airplane can travel all the way across some
states in the same time that it takes an interurban train to travel
across one large city.
However, there are other considerations affecting the question,
having to do with the design of the planes. The general opinion
is that the trend is toward a small plane accommodating from
eight to ten passengers and with single lavatory and toilet facili-
ties.152 The reason is mainly economy. With such small planes,
any separation by means of a wall would not only be impracticabie
but would also probably result in the loss of the Federal license
for the plane, since licensed planes are constructed under pre-
scribed specifications which are not-usually permitted to be changed
to any great extent. Consequently, since many states require a
Federal license, such a Jim Crow regulation by a state would be an
undue burden upon interstate commerce, and unconstitutiona!.
An alternative, of course, would be to require the intrastate
airline to fly separate planes for the accommodation of colored
persons. This would avoid the interstate commerce problem. But
it would be highly undesirable from the airline operator's point
of view. For the present, at least, airlines are sacrificing a great
as it is governed in the manner that the national legislature constitutionally
ordains."
152. See interesting article by P. G. Johnson, "23-Hour Coast-tc,-Coast
Passenger Trips Soon", in the Chicago Herald-Examiner, July 24, 1932.
"Report of Committee on Airport Drainage and Surfacing," Aeronautics
Branch Department of Commerce, Dec. 1, 1931, p. 7: "What will be the
size and weight of the airplane of tomorrow? The linit of size of the
airplane is still far from being settled. Operating economics as much as
design limitations will probably determine dimensions and capacities. De-
signers are hesitant about expressing very positive opinions on this whole
question but seem to feel that the demands by the public for frequent
schedules will limit the maximum gross weight of transport airplanes, for
some time to come at least, to a figure ranging somewhere from 20,000 to
30,000 pounds. Present indications are that there is a tendency to sacrifice
the pay load of transport airplanes for speed, with the result that in all
probability the transport airplanes of the near future will not likely have
a much higher gross weight than those now in use."
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deal in the hope of future profit. Their work to produce more
traffic is no easy matter, with most people inherently afraid of
this new mode of travel. Their fares have been reduced abnorm-
ally low in view of the greater service rendered by them. Thus,
their revenues do not greatly exceed their costs, and in many cases
it is opposite. Furthermore, it is not customary to keep reserve
airplanes at all stations. A plane carrying one class of passengers
might not be able to get through to a station because of bad weather
conditions, and yet the plane which was to accommodate the other
class might get through. The carrier would then be subject to the
charge that it would be contrary to law to carry one race and not
the other. In addition, the negro air traffic is extremely light and
probably will continue to be. Therefore, it would be an intolerable
burden on any airline to have to provide the equipment necessary
to operate the extra service.
The only alternative appears to be the requirement of separate
seating in different parts of the plane. But even this is not alto-
gether desirable, since an airline should not be compelled to sacri-
fice any of its seats and leave them empty merely because a white
person might not care to sit near a colored individual.
It is far better to leave this perplexing situation for the air-
lines to handle without state interference. In fact, at present,
whether in the north or in the south, where members of both races
are assigned to the same plane, colored persons are usually seated
in the rear and white persons in the front part of the plane.
Carrier's Rules Requiring Separation.
The right of a common carrier to make reasonable regulations
for the conduct of its business permits it to separate white and
colored persons aboard its conveyances.1 5 8
153. Hall v. DeCuir, supra, note 105; Chiles v. C. & 0. R. Co., 218
U. S. 71 (Ky., 1910) ; Green v. The City of Bridgetown, Fed. Cas. No. 5754
(Ga., 1879); Logwood v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 23 Fed. 318 (Tenn., 1885)_;
Murphy v. Western & A. R. R., 23 Fed. 637 (Tenn., 1885); The Sue, 23
Fed. 843 (1885) ; McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 Fed. 639 (Md., 1889) ; Hauck v.
Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 38 Fed. 226 (Tex., 1888) ; Bowie v. Birmingham
Railway & Electric Co., 125 Ala. 397, 27 S. 1016, 50 L. R. A. 632, 82 Am.
St. Rep. 247 (1900) ; Ohio Val. Ry's. Receiver v. Lander, supra, note 143,
p. 347; Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., supra, note 30, p. 365; Smith
v. Chamberlain, 38 S. C. 529, 17 S. E. 371, 19 L. R. A. 710 (1893) ; West-
chester & Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles, supra, note 108; Note, 11 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 268; Barnes, Interstate Transportation, pp. 576-7 (1910)
Mitchie, Carriers, pp. 1944-5; M. G. Roberts, Federal Liability of Carriers,
,p. 561 (2d ed., 1929); Contra: Coger v. North West Union Packet Co.,
37 Ia. 145 (1873).
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n an early case most often cited for its reasoning the court
said :1s'
"The right of carrier to separate his passengers is founded upon two
grounds-his right of private property in the means of conveyances, and
t he public interest. The private means he uses belong wholly to himself,
and imply the right of control for the protection of his own interest, as
well as the performance of his public duty. He may use his property,
therefore, in a reasonable manner. It is not an unreasonable regulation
to seat passengers so as to preserve order and decorum, and to prevent
contacts and collisions arising from natural or well-known customary
repugnancies, which are likely to breed disturbances by a promiscuous
sitting. This is a proper use of the right of private property, because
it tends to protect the interests of the carrier as well as the interests of
those he carries. If the ground of regulation be reasonable, courts of
justice cannot interfere with his rights of property. The right of the
passenger is only that of being carried safely, and with due regard to
his personal comfort and convenience which are promoted by a sound
and well-regulated separation of passengers. An analogy and an illus-
tration are found in the case of an innkeeper, who, if lie have room, is
bound to receive guests. But a guest in an inn cannot select his room
or his bed at pleasure; nor can a voyager take possession of a cabin or
a berth at will or refuse to obey the reasonable orders of the captain' of
a vessel. But, on the other hand, who would maintain that it is a
reasonable regulation, either of an inn or a vessel, to compel the passengers
black and white, to room and bed together? If a right of private prop-
erty confers no right of control, who shall decide a contest between
passengers for seats or berths? Courts of Justice may interpose to compel
those who perform a business concerning the public, by the use of private
means, to fulfill their duty to the public-but not a whit beyond."
A common carrier has an unquestionable right to seat its
passengers wherever it desires. The passenger can merely demand
that he be carried. 155 For this reason the carrier may segregate
its white and colored passengers. But, all passengers must be
treated alike. Consequently, all accommodations for which the
same fares are charged must be substantially equal.15 6
154. Westchester & Philadelphia Railroad Co. v. Miles, supra, note 108.
155.. Galena & Chi,:ago Union Railroad Co. v. Yarwood, 15 111. 468(1854) ; Brumfeld v. Consolidated Coach Corp. supra, note 30; Day v. Owen,
supra, note 79, p. 525; Chesapeake Ohio & Southwestern Rd. Co. v. Wells,
85 Tenn. 613 (1887); Memphis & Charleston Rd. v. Benson, 85 Tenn. 627
(1887).
156. Gray v. Cincinnati Southern R. Co., 11 Fed. 683 (Ohio, 1882)
The Sue, supra, note 153; C. & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 55 Ill. 185,
8 Am. Rep. 641 (1870); Chilton v. St. Louis & I. M. R. Co., 21 S. W. 457,
19 L. R. A. 269 (Mo., 1893) ; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Loftus, 234
Pac. 607 (Okla., 1925); Murphy v. Western & A. R. R., supra, note 153;
McGuinn v. Forbes, supra, note 153; Logwood v. Memphis & C. R.- Co.,
supra, note 153; Houck v. S. P. Ry. Co., supra, note 153; Green v. The City
of Bridgetown, supra, note 153; Councill v. Western & Atlantic R. R. Co.,
1 1. C. C. R. 638 (1887); Heard v. Georgia R. R. Co., 1 I. C. C. R. 719
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Congress has preserved this right by allowing carriers falling
within the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act to provide
for such segregation when equal accommodations are afforded. 157
Airlines are not, however, included in the Interstate Com-
merce Act. Hence, Congress not having acted, it is presumptive
that interstate airlines are free to make reasonable regulations
separating passengers because of race and color." 8  This presump-
tion is strengthened by the fact that Congress permits those car-
riers coming within the Act to make such regulations.
In a recent case, a colored woman was refused a seat on a
bus. The bus company had a rule that seats could be reserved in
advance on a particular bus and that those without seats had to
wait for a subsequent bus. The plaintiff bought her ticket and
demanded a seat aboard the vehicle in question just before time
for it to leave. There were two unoccupied seats, but the carrier
refused to let her occupy one of them since both had previously
been reserved. The carrier was upheld in its contention that its
rule was reasonable as incident to its ownership of property and
as an aid in serving the public and that it would be abrogating its
contracts with those for whom the two vacant seats were reserved
if others were allowed to occupy them.159  The result in this case
is important inasmuch as the facts very closely resemble those ex-
isting on most airlines where all seats customarily are reserved.
Not only are the seats on airplanes held subject to reservations,
but there is also the safety factor which requires further considera-
tion, where colored and white persons apply for passage on the
same plane. The carrier has the right to protect its property from
destruction and it owes a duty to protect its passengers from harm.
While it also owes a duty to afford equal accommodations for all
passengers, still it may separate them, either by providing separate
compartments or separate vehicles. At the same time all persons
have a right to be carried, unless they have personal disqualifica-
tions which permit the carrier to bar them.
Consequently, our conclusion is that a rule under which an
airline, at its discretion, may refuse to accept a person for passage
(1888); Edwards v. N. C. & St. L. R. Co., 12 I. C. C. R. 247 (1907) ; Cozart
v. Southern Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C. R. 226 (1909) ; Gaines v. Seaboard Air Line
R. Co., 16 I. C. C. R. 471 (1909) ; Barnes, op. cit., note 153; Mitchie, op.
cit., note 153; M. G. Roberts, op. cit., note 153.
157. See Councill v. Western 6& Atlantic R. R. Co., supra; Heard v.
Georgia R. R. Co., supra; Edwards v. N. C. & St. L. R. Co., supra; Cozart
v. Southern Ry. Co., supra; Gaines v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., supra.
158. Chiles v. C. & 0. R. Co., supra, note 153.
159. Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., supra, note 30.
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after another person of opposite race and color has reserved a seat
on the same plane is reasonable, provided the circumstances justify
it on the ground of safety, comfort and convenience. Such cir-
cumstances exist in most sections of the south. If a close contact
between persons of opposite races might lead to endangering the
security of all the passengers and also the plane in which they are
riding, the airline has the right to protect its property and it has
the duty to protect its passengers by appropriate regulation. Since
the rule applies alike to colored and white persons under similar
circumstances there is no violation of equality of right. Neither
the white nor the colored person is thereby refused passage be-
cause of race or color, but because of the personal disqualification
which is the result of conflicting racial characteristics likely to
endanger property and human life if inter-mixed.
SUMMARY
(1) An airline is a common carrier and, as such, at common
law and by virtue of the 14th Amendment, must carry all who
apply and are not subject to personal disqualifications for which
they may be barred.
(2) An airplane in flight is so greatly affected by the safety
factor that any person may be rejected who, by reason of personal
disqualifications, will materially increase the hazards of travel.
(3) An airline may make and enforce any reasonable regu-
lations intended to promote its duty to serve the public and to
protect its passengers and property.
(4) Civil Rights statutes, as a rule, do not apply to airlines.
(5) No Jim Crow laws apply directly to airlines. In any
event, it is not likely that they are applicable to interstate carriers.
(6) An airline may separate colored and white passengers
irrespective of statutes and whether intrastate or interstate, if they
are treated equally.
